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this long standing law to this case, the dis-
sent found that the warrant specified that 
only McWebb's apartment could be sear-
ched. Therefore, the search of Garrison's 
apartment was warrantless and because the 
state did not advance any exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, all evidence seized 
from the search should have been suppress-
ed. 
In addition, the dissent found the majori-
ty's analysis concerning the reasonableness 
of the way in which the warrant was 
executed to be unpersuasive. Because 
multiple-occupancy buildings are now 
common, the conduct of the officers could 
hardly be deemed reasonable. The dissent 
found any reasonable basis for the search 
to be lacking because the police failed to 
thoroughly investigate the premises before 
obtaining the warrant; failed to question 
Garrison prior to beginning the search as 
to the location of his residence, and failed 
to take into account the obvious lay-out of 
the third floor which revealed two sepa-
rate apartments. As viewed by the dissent, 
these facts, would have enabled a 
reasonable officer to realize the factual 
mistake before any contraband was seized. 
Garrison, provides another example of 
the Supreme Court's willingness to broad-
en the good-faith exception to the warrant 
requirement. Although case-by-case analy-
sis can only determine if the good-faith 
exception to the warrant requirement has 
been fulfilled, if Garrison is the benchmark 
by which good-faith is measured then it 
seems clear that in most cases good-faith 
will be found. 
- Amy Kushner 
First English Evangelical Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles: 
TIlE EVOLUTION OF THE JUST 
COMPENSATION CLAUSE-
COURT REQUIRES MONETARY 
COMPENSATION FOR 
TEMPORARY REGULATORY 
TAKING OF PROPERTY 
Marred by a history of incomplete clari-
fication, the issue of whether a landowner 
is entitled to compensation for a tempo-
rary regulatory taking of property pursu-
ant to the Just Compensation Clause of 
the fifth amendment of the United States 
Constituion has finally been settled in First 
English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378 
(1987), (First English). Historically, the 
remedy for a taking of property by inverse 
condemnation was invalidation of the 
unconstitutional regulation, but the 
United States Supreme Court in First 
English has authoritatively held in a 6-3 
decision that monetary relief is an accep-
table remedy. 
The First English Evangelical Church of 
Glendale owned and operated a camp 
(Lutherglen) for handicapped children in 
Angles Natural Forest. In February of 
1978 a storm flooded the watershed. The 
massive infusion of water forced the Mill 
Creek, which ran through Lutherglen, to 
overflow its banks. Consequently, the 
property was inundated, the buildings 
were destroyed and the camp was rendered 
useless unless rebuilt. 
Subsequently, in response to an everpre-
sent hazardous flood condition posed by 
an earlier topographic change in the Mill 
Creek Canyon, Los Angeles County 
adopted an ordinance, which read in part, 
"[a] person shall not construct, reconstruct, 
place or enlarge any building or structure, 
any portion of which is, or will be, located 
within the outer boundry lines of the 
interim flood protection area located in 
Mill Creek Canyon." Id. at 2381-2382, 
cltmg Los Angeles, Ca., Interim 
Ordinance No. 11,855 (Jan. 1979) (empha-
sis added). The law adversely affected the 
Church's interest in Lutherglen, prohibit-
ing its reconstruction. 
In response to the regulation the Church 
filed suit in the Superior Court of Califor-
nia alleging that the law denied the church 
of all use of the property. FollowingAgins 
v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266 (1979), the court 
denied relief by inverse condemnation. 
Agins stands for the proposition that main-
tenance of a suit for damages in inverse 
condemnation cases is the equivalent of 
coercing the state to exercise its eminent 
domain powers. Thus the only relief, in 
California, when a regulation was found a 
denial of a substantial amount of property 
rights would have been declaratory relief 
or mandamus. See, Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
On appeal, the California Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court decision 
on similar grounds and, "because the 
United States Supreme Court has not yet 
ruled on the question of whether a state 
may constitutionally limit the remedy for 
a taking to nonmonetary relief." 107 S.Ct. 
2383. The Church appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. 478 U.S. -0 106 
S.Ct. 3292 (1986). In prior cases seeking to 
address the issue, the Court had refused to 
settle the matter because in those appeals 
the Court had deemed each case as "not 
ripe" or "lacking finality." Se~ Mac· 
Donald, Sommers and Frates v. Yolo Coun· 
ty 106 S.Ct. 2561 (1986) (A lack of a fmal 
determination by a county planning board 
as to how to apply a regulation prevents a 
decision of whether a taking has occur-
red.), Williamson County Regional Plan 
ning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172 (1985) (Petitioners failure to exhaust 
all state remedies to resolve a situation, 
[i.e. application for a zoning variance, fol-
lowing state administrative procedures to 
collect compensation before filing suit,] 
renders the case as pending therefore pre-
cluding a decision by the Court for a lack 
of finality at the state level.), San Diego Gas 
andElec. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) 
(When a state court decision is not final, 
the Court cannot review the case pursuant 
to 28 U.S.c. § 1257.), Agins v. Tiburon, 
4n U.S. 255 (1980). 
Despite the fact that the ordinance had 
yet to be deemed unconstitutional as a tak-
ing of property without providing just 
compensation, the Court did address the 
compensation issue. Seegenerally, 107 S.Ct. 
at 2389-2390 (Where the dissenting opin-
ion refuses to agree with the majority 
opinion because of the "lack of finality" 
issue). 
In its opinion, the Court noted that the 
Just Compensation clause of the fifth 
amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion applies to the states throught the four-
teenth amendment. Therefore, a state is 
required to financially compensate a prop-
erty owner for an actual physical taking. 
Furthermore, under Mahon, a regulation 
may be so excessive that it works a taking 
under inverse condemnation theory, deny-
ing the property owner of the use of the 
land without taking the property itself. Id. 
at 2386. The Court perceived no difference 
in the circumstances when a state physical-
ly deprives a landowner of its rights by 
eminent domain and when the deprava-
tion is perpetrated by regulatory encroach-
ment. Thus, because there are not 
distinguishing differences between emi-
nent domain and inverse condemnation 
takings, the Court held that the just com-
pensation clause warrants monetary com-
pensation in the regulatory taking 
situation. 
Under the facts in First English, the 
petitioner-Church alleged a taking for the 
period commencing from the time when 
the ordinance because effective accruing 
up until when the regulation would be 
struck down. Typically, U[o]nce a court 
determines that a taking has occurred, the 
government retains the whole range of 
options already available-amendment of 
the regulation, withdrawal of the inva-
lidated regulation, or the exercise of emi-
nent domain," Id. at 2389, thus leaving the 
property owner harmed for the period of 
time in which the law was effective. Until 
First English. landowners had no oppor-
tunity to recover damages for the "regula-
tory wrongs" of local government. 
Siding with the Church's argument, the 
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Court declared, "[w]e merely hold that 
where the government's activities have 
already worked a taking of all use of prop-
erty, no subsequent action by the govern-
ment can relieve it of the duty to provide 
compensation for the period during which 
the taking was effective." Id. Thus, on 
remand, should a California court declare 
the ordinance to effect a taking, Los 
Angeles County must compensate the 
Church for a period beginning when the 
ordinance became effective until it is 
declared void. 
Having finally clarified the issue of 
damages for inverse condemnation, land-
owners may feel relieved that they can 
receive compensation should a local 
government go too far in regulating land 
use. Anyone desiring to challenge such 
laws promulgated pursuant to police 
powers must still follow local and state 
procedures in pursuit of administrative 
remedies before a regulation may be chal-
lenged as an unconstitutional taking. Only 
then will the law be struck down when the 
challenger proves that it has been denied of 
all reasonable uses of the land. See general· 
ly, Id. at 2389. 
As a result of First English. the Court has 
extended the Just Compensation Clause to 
the fullest extent possible by allowing 
compensation for a temporary regulatory 
taking of property. In subjecting local, 
state and federal goverments to financial 
liability, despite a legislative power to 
amend or repeal an excessively encroach-
ing law, the Court has simultaneously pro-
vided the widest possible protection of 
property rights and also inhibited local 
governments in their attempts to regulate 
land use by the police powers. 
-Martin S. Goldberg 
Reagan (.I. Rider:·STEPPARENT 
COMMITIlNG CHILD ABUSE 
UABLE FOR INTENTIONAL 
INFUCTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS 
In Reagan t:I. Rider, 70 Md. App. 503, 521 
A.2d 1246 (1987), the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the position 
of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
by holding that a teenage girl who had suf-
fered from a six-year pattern of sexual 
abuse inflicted by her stepfather proved 
causation and injury sufficient for the jury 
to consider her claim of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. In so holding, 
the court has given a clear signal that a 
stepparent committing child abuse may be 
sued for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
Glenda Ann Rider began living with her 
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mother, stepfather, grandmother and two 
stepbrothers at age ten. She claimed that 
she was the victim of several hundred sex-
ual encounters with her stepfather which 
occurred while she was between the ages 
of eleven and seventeen. The encounters 
included sexual contact such as masturba-
tion and cunnilingus, but not sexual inter-
course. At first, she did not resist, but as 
she grew older she began to resist and 
eventually reported the activity to her 
mother. At her mother's urging, the police 
were notified and criminal charges were 
brought against the stepfather, John Mat-
thew Reagan. Mr. Reagan was tried and 
acquitted of the criminal charges. 
A civil suit including a claim of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was 
brought in the Circuit Court for Balti-
more County. The intentional infliction 
of emotional distress was the only count 
submitted to the jury and a verdict in favor 
of Ms. Rider in the amount of $28,845 
($18,845 compensatory damages and 
$10,000 punitive damages) was entered. 
Mr. Reagan appealed. 
The court of special appeals noted that 
the four elements necessary to impose 
liability for a claim of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress are essentially 
those listed in Section 46 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, Ch. 2, Emotional 
Distress (1965) are as follows: 
(1) The conduct must be intentional or 
reckless; 
(2) The conduct must be extreme and 
outrageous; 
(3) There must be a causal connection 
between the wrongful conduct and 
the emotional distress; and 
(4) The emotional distress must be 
severe. 
The court of special appeals viewed the 
case as presenting two questions: 
(1) Whether the evidence presented at 
trial was legally sufficient to allow 
submission of the case to the jury on 
the issue of causation; and 
(2) Whether the evidence presented at 
trial was legally sufficient to allow 
submission of the case to the jury on 
the issue of the severity of emotional 
distress? 
Reagan, 70 Md. App. at 505, 521 A.2d at 
1247. 
Ms. Rider testified at trial that because of 
the sexual advances of her stepfather she 
had suffered extreme embarrassment, 
depression, mortification, humiliation and 
severe weight gain. In addition, Ms. Rider 
claimed that the sexual abuse hampered 
her ability to form normal relationships 
and caused her to engage in forms of unu-
sual sexual behavior. 
At trial, the testimony was supported by 
the opinion of Dr. Michael N. Spodak, a 
forensic and clinical psychiatrist, who tes-
tified as an expert. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland separated its written opinion 
into two parts in order to deal with the 
two issues of causation and severity. 
In regard to the issue of causation, appel-
lant asserted that appellee failed to show a 
causal connection because the appellee's 
emotional distress did not become 
apparent immediately after and in direct 
response to the sexual acts. Moniodis 'D. 
Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212, cen. 
denied, 304 Md. 631 (1985). The Reagan 
court however, rejected the interpretation 
that Moniodis requires that the distress 
must immediately follow the event which 
caused it. 
Appellant further argued that there was 
evidence of other traumatic events which 
could have contributed to Ms. Rider's dis-
tress. This argument was also rejected by 
the court since the testimony of both Ms. 
Rider and Dr. Spodak indicated that any 
other possible causes of Ms. Rider's dis-
tress were directly attributable to appel-
lant's conduct. 
Accordingly, the court found adequate 
evidence from which a jury could find that 
appellee's emotional distress was caused by 
appellant's sexual abuse. 
In regard to the issue of severity, the 
Reagan court noted that the court of 
appeals requires the plaintiff to show that 
she suffered a severely disabling emotional 
response to the defendant's conduct. Har· 
ris 'D. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 570, 380 A.2d 
611,617 (1977). The court of appeals went 
on to quote comment; of Section 46 of the 
Restatement, supra, which says in perti-
nent part, "[the] law intervenes only 
where the distress inflicted is so severe that 
no reasonable man could be expected to 
endure it." Harris, 281 Md. at 570, 380 
A.2d at 616-617. 
The Harris court also indicated that "it 
is for the court to determine whether, on 
the evidence, severe emotional distress can 
be found; it is for the jury to determine 
whether, on the evidence, it has in fact 
existed." 281 Md. at 571, 380 A.2d at 617. 
The Reagan court then proclaimed: 
We think the evidence in this case 
clearly established that appellee's dis-
tress is not a "nueurotic overreaction 
to trivial hurts" which "are the price 
of a complex society." It is not "tran-
sient and trivial." Nor is it of such a 
nature that a "reasonable person in 
civilized society should be expected to 
endure it." 
Reagan, 70 Md. App. at 507, 521 A.2d at 
